Quant Sentinel — Security Assessment Report

Target: https://app.acme-corp.com Repository: ./acme-portal Date: 2026-07-28 Model: claude-opus-4.8 Duration: 71 minutes Total Cost: $61.40

Validation status: Findings marked CONFIRMED are reproduced live and machine-verified against captured evidence (a proof_token must appear verbatim in the captured response). Findings marked Claimed have concrete supporting detail but no proof-verified reproduction this run. Findings marked Unverified are theoretical or were actively disproven (false-positive verdicts with the reasoning recorded).

Findings Summary

Total analyzed findings: 12 (12 unique after cross-queue dedup) — Confirmed: 10, Claimed: 1, Unverified: 1.

Confirmed Findings (proof-verified)

INJ-VULN-01: SQL Injection in Search Endpoint

Description

The /api/search endpoint builds a PostgreSQL query via string interpolation of the user-supplied q parameter, passed to prisma.$queryRawUnsafe without parameterization.

Exploitation (deterministic confirmation)

GET /api/search?q=%27%20UNION%20SELECT%20version(),null,null--%20
→ 200 OK
response_excerpt: "PostgreSQL 16.2 on x86_64-pc-linux-gnu, compiled by gcc (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0, 64-bit"
proof_token: PostgreSQL 16.2  ✓ verbatim in captured response

FILE-VULN-01: SVG Upload Rendered Inline (Stored XSS)

Exploitation

The upload path accepts .svg and the serve route returns it as Content-Type: image/svg+xml with no attachment disposition, executing inline <script> in the application origin. The agent’s canary SVG fetched an out-of-band callback URL when rendered — the callback interaction was recorded as proof.

INJ-VULN-02: Time-Based Blind SQLi in Sort Parameter

No response-body signal exists for this injection. The agent minted an oob_interact canary, embedded it in a payload triggering an outbound lookup, and observed the target’s resolver contact the canary — converting a blind finding from “potential” to proof-verified via the recorded interaction.

Claimed Findings (witness captured, not reproduced this run)

SSRF-VULN-02: Image Proxy Resolves Link-Local Hosts

The image proxy fetches attacker-supplied URLs and resolves link-local/loopback addresses, but the response body is a generic error with no content. No out-of-band signal was observed this run; the agent recorded the resolver behavior as a witness and kept the finding at Claimed rather than upgrading without proof.

Unverified Findings (actively disproven)

AUTH-VULN-02: JWT Accepted with alg: none

Analysis flagged JWT validation as potentially accepting unsigned tokens. Live testing with forged alg: none tokens returned 401 token signature invalid on every attempt — the verifier enforces signature checks. Recorded as false-positive with the rejecting response preserved, so the claim is closed rather than left ambiguous.

Identified Findings Roster (all analyzed findings)

Every unique finding from the analysis phase, independent of whether exploitation confirmed it. The same issue reported by several queues is collapsed into one canonical row — the other ids are noted inline (“also reported as …”) so no finding is silently dropped.

Total analyzed findings: 13 (12 unique after cross-queue dedup) — Confirmed: 10, Claimed: 1, Unverified: 1.

Remediation

CWE-89 — SQL Injection (INJ-VULN-01, INJ-VULN-02)

Use parameterized queries / prepared statements for every dynamic fragment — never string interpolation. With Prisma, replace $queryRawUnsafe with $queryRaw bindings or the query builder; where raw SQL is unavoidable, bind parameters explicitly.

Applies to: INJ-VULN-01, INJ-VULN-02

CWE-918 — SSRF (SSRF-VULN-01, SSRF-VULN-02)

Enforce an egress allowlist of permitted hosts/schemes; resolve and validate the destination IP before connecting; deny link-local, loopback, and RFC1918 ranges by default; require IMDSv2 on AWS so metadata responses need a session token.

Applies to: SSRF-VULN-01, SSRF-VULN-02

CWE-434 — Unrestricted File Upload (FILE-VULN-01)

Reject client-executable types (svg/html/xhtml) by content sniffing, not extension alone; store uploads outside the web root; serve with Content-Disposition: attachment and X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff for anything that isn’t a known-safe image type.

Applies to: FILE-VULN-01

CWE-862 — Missing Authorization (AUTHZ-VULN-02, GQL-VULN-01)

Enforce authorization checks at the handler and resolver level for every privileged operation — presence of a session is not authorization. Apply role checks uniformly across REST routes, GraphQL resolvers, and nested objects.

Applies to: AUTHZ-VULN-02, GQL-VULN-01

CWE-330 — Insufficient Randomness (AUTH-VULN-01)

Issue session tokens from a CSPRNG with at least 128 bits of entropy and verify integrity server-side (or use signed/encrypted tokens). Never derive sessions from user-controlled identifiers such as user ids.

Applies to: AUTH-VULN-01

Machine-readable export: findings.sarif (SARIF 2.1.0 — per-class rules, CWE mappings, partial fingerprints, and Confirmed/Claimed/Unverified status per result).